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Does Experience Matter? 
CEO Successions by Former CEOs 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We distinguish external CEO successors between those who have and those who do not have 
previous CEO experience.  We find that the stock market reacts positively to the hiring of an exCEO.  
Compared with firms that hire non-exCEOs, firms that hire exCEOs had higher debt ratios and 
greater bankruptcy chances pre-succession, but post-succession, these firms still have worse 
financial performances.   Non-exCEOs come from larger firms than exCEOs.  There is no 
consistently significant difference in compensation between an exCEO and a non-exCEO, though 
the compensation for both increases significantly from that of the predecessor’s and that of their 
previous positions.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
On August 3rd, 2009, the troubled insurance giant AIG announced that it would replace the 
retiring CEO Edward Liddy with Robert Benmosche, the former MetLife CEO.  AIG shares gained 
a modest 3.5% on that day.  However, on September 30, 2009, Hartford Financial announced the 
hiring of Liam McGee, Bank of America's former head of consumer banking as its new chairman 
and CEO. Hartford stock fell 3.4% on that day, and continued to fall 5.7% the next day.  Both 
successors are from outside the hiring firm, but one key difference between them is that Benmosche 
was formerly a CEO while McGee was not.  Though market reactions to these succession 
announcements could be purely random, and there could be other factors behind their stock price 
movements, the issue of prior CEO experience of outside CEO successors is, nevertheless, 
important and warrants a closer look, especially if hiring an experienced CEO can help to turn-
around a troubled company. 
 The study of CEO turnover remains an important research topic in part because the current 
economic climate has increased turnover rates.  Research by Chicago-based executive recruitment 
firm Challenger Gray & Christmas has estimated that 1,484 CEOs left their jobs in 2008, the 
equivalent of six every working day, the most since the company began monitoring the market in 
1999.   Virtually all academic research on successor CEO origin focuses on the distinction between 
outside successors and those from inside the company.  In prior decades, inside succession was 
considerably more common than outside succession (Helmich, 1974; Dalton & Kesner, 1983; 
Friedman & Singh, 1989).  However, in recent years, the trend has reversed: Huson, Parrino and 
Starks (2001) find that the frequency of outside successions has increased from the 1970’s to the 
1990’s.  Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) discuss the relative frequency of external vs. internal CEO 
replacements for companies in the annual Forbes surveys from 1970 through 2005. During the 
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1970s and 1980s, outside hires accounted for 15% and 17% of all CEO replacements, respectively. 
In contrast, during the 1990s more than one in four CEOs were hired from outside the company, and 
in the first half of the 2000s almost a third of all CEOs were hired from outside the company. 
 In addition, Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) indicate that the percentage of outside hires with 
prior experience as a CEO of a publicly traded company has risen from less than 20% in the 1970s 
to nearly 50% in the 1990s. The average number of firms where the new CEO had been a prior CEO 
has nearly tripled over this time period (since many of the newly appointed CEOs had held this 
position at several firms previously). The average number of prior corporate employers has risen 
significantly from the 1970s (when the typical CEO had been employed by an average of 1.88 other 
corporations) to the 1990s (when the typical CEO had been employed by an average of 2.72 other 
corporations).  
Agrawal, Knoeber and Tsoulouha (2006) argue that outside CEO successors are 
handicapped in the sense that they are only chosen if they are much better than the best insider 
candidate.  Companies often appoint an outside candidate when its prior performance has been poor 
and when the situation calls for new direction (Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993; Davidson, Worrell & 
Dutia, 1993; Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  As a result, the stock market tends to react more positively to 
the announcement of outside CEO appointments than to inside CEO appointments (Lubatkin, 
Chung, Rogers & Owers, 1989; Borokhovich, Parrino & Trapani, 1996; Huson, Malatesta & Parrino, 
2004). 
 Though the research on outside CEO succession has been extensive, there has been little 
research on the differences between outside CEO successors who have prior CEO experience versus 
those without CEO experience.  Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007) argue that a successor’s general 
managerial skills may be more important than his firm-specific skills. The requirement for 
Page 3 of 32 Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
3 
 
managerial skills would give exCEOs an edge over those who were not CEOs in their previous 
firms.  In addition, hiring an outsider with prior CEO experience may reduce the uncertainty that an 
outsider brings to the new firm because the candidate with prior CEO experience has a track record 
as CEO that the new firm, the stock market, and the firm’s other constituents can observe.   
In this paper, we compare the antecedents and consequences of firms that hire outsiders with 
prior CEO experience to those outsiders that do not have this experience.  First, we examine the 
stock market reaction to the succession announcements.  We find that the market reacts positively to 
succession announcements when the successor has prior CEO experience but not when the outside 
successor lacks this experience.  Second, we examine the financial performance of these two groups 
of firms prior to the succession.  We find that firms hiring a CEO with experience have a worse 
financial condition (measured by their Z-scores) and higher debt ratios than those hiring a non-
exCEO.  Third, we compare the outsiders’ previous firms.  Non-exCEOs come from larger firms 
than exCEOs, but other performance measures show no significant differences.  Fourth, we examine 
the pay of the two groups of successors.  Surprisingly, there is no consistent significant difference in 
compensation, both in amount and in structure, between an exCEO and a non-exCEO, though both 
increase significantly in amount from that of the predecessor’s and that of their previous 
positions.  Finally, we examine the financial performance post-succession.  After hiring an exCEO, 
the successor firms still have worse financial performance than non-exCEO successor firms, and the 
pre-to-post change in performance is insignificant between the two groups of successors.    
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows.  Section 2 reviews past literature on 
CEO turnover and succession with a focus on successor origin.  Based on the literature review, we 
establish six testable hypotheses.  In section 3 we discuss the sample and data.  In section 4 we 
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discuss our results.  Section 5 summarizes robustness checks with alternative factors.  Section 6 
concludes.   
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Outsider Succession Literature 
There is considerable literature on the origin of CEO successors.  Some of this research has 
found that firms tend to hire outside successors when their performance has been poor (Boeker & 
Goodstein, 1993; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Davidson, Worrell & Dutia, 1993; Kesner and Sebora, 
1994).  One conclusion from this research is that companies appoint an outside successor when 
there is a need for a new direction in hope of improved performance.     
As a result, investors usually welcome the hiring of an outside successor.  Lubatkin, Chung, 
Rogers and Owers (1989), document a positive reaction from the stock market at the announcement 
of the hiring of an outside CEO, especially for firms that had poor prior performance.  Positive 
market reactions to the hiring announcements of outside successors have also been documented in 
Reinganum (1985), Chung, Lubatkin, Rogers, and Owers (1987), Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), 
Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (1996) and Davidson, Nemec, Worrell, and Lin (2002).  Huson, 
Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) find that firm performance does improve following the appointment 
of an outside CEO, and the stock market reacts positively to the appointment and to the later 
improved performance.  Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007) state that boards are more likely to 
appoint outside successors when their general managerial skills are more important than firm-
specific skills. This would give successors with CEO experience an advantage over those who do 
not have the experience.   
Another area of research is the industrial origin of outside successors.  Coles, McWilliams, 
and Sen (2001) document the importance of industry related variables in corporate governance 
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decisions.  The industry effect on governance has also been documented by Jenter and Kanaan 
(2008); poor industry performance and even poor performance of the entire market are not filtered 
out by corporate boards in CEO dismissal decisions. As a result, poor industry and market 
conditions significantly increase the chance of forced CEO turnovers.  However, Kaplan and 
Minton (2006) show that it is only the internal turnovers that are significantly related to three 
components of firm performance—performance relative to industry, industry performance relative 
to the overall market, and the performance of the overall market, while external turnovers are not 
significantly related to any of them.  Industry effects may also be present in board hiring decisions. 
Parrino (1997) argues that succession decisions may be influenced by industry specific human 
capital of successor candidates.  In addition, the stock market reacts more positively to 
announcements of outside successions when the outsider comes from the same industry as the new 
firm (Davidson, Nemec, Worrell, and Lin, 2002).  Due to the extensive research in industry origin 
of CEO successors, we control for the industry effect in our analyses in this paper. 
 
2.2 Antecedents to Hiring a Successor with CEO Experience 
What would prior CEO experience do for a successor candidate?  CEO experience would 
give the successor experience with the demands of being at the helm of an organization. While 
outside successors either with or without CEO experience would need time to learn about their new 
company, the non-exCEO would also have to learn to be a CEO.  The exCEO, on the other hand, 
would likely have a shorter learning curve having already experienced the demands of a CEO 
position.  In addition, having CEO experience would lessen the uncertainty that is inherent in a 
succession decision.  The new firm and the market can view the experienced candidate’s 
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performance as CEO, something that cannot be done for outside successors without CEO experience.  
Because of the reduced uncertainty, we propose the following first hypothesis:  
H1: The stock market will react more positively towards succession announcements when the 
outside successor has prior CEO experience than when the successor does not. 
Prior research has documented that firms are more likely to hire outsiders rather than 
insiders following poor performance.  The goal of hiring an outsider under these conditions is to 
make changes that will improve the financial performance of the firm.  We propose that firms with 
poor performance will want an experienced leader as the successor; therefore, firms that hire 
successors with CEO experience will have worse prior financial performance than firms that hire 
outside CEOs without CEO experience.  This provides our second hypothesis. 
H2: Firms that hire successors with CEO experience are likely to have experienced worse 
financial performance than firms hiring a successor without CEO experience. 
Ocasio (1999) proposes that firms rely on informal rules of appropriateness to keep 
organizational activities on track particularly in ambiguous situations.  Hiring an outsider without 
CEO experience creates more uncertainty than when the outsider has CEO experience.  Following 
the rules of appropriateness if a firm hiring an outside successor cannot hire an experienced CEO 
then the prior performance, size and industry of the successor’s prior firm may become more 
important to their hiring decision1.  Since the board is not hiring an experienced outsider, the board 
must be able to justify its decision; it can do so by hiring an outside candidate from a larger firm that 
is performing well.  Since the board can justify its decision to hire an exCEO based on the 
candidate’s experience at the helm, the issue of the prior-firm performance and industry would play 
a smaller role in the board’s decision.  This provides our third hypotheses:  
                                                          
1
 Note that this does not mean that firms hiring exCEOs do not consider the performance of the 
previous firms the successor comes from. 
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H3a: Non-exCEOs come from bigger and better performing firms than exCEOs. 
 
H3b: Non-exCEOs are more likely to come from the same industry than exCEOs. 
 
 
2.3. Outsider Successor Bargaining Experience  
If the goal of executives is advancement then the CEO position would be highly coveted.  
Being hired as a CEO would bring the executive to the top position in the company.  Once a board 
makes the decision to hire an outside successor, the CEO candidate and board would negotiate the 
position.  While there would be many potential issues to negotiate, compensation amount and 
structure for the successor would be a potential negotiation topic.  A candidate for the position who 
does not have CEO experience may have a reduced bargaining position when compared to the 
candidate with CEO experience.  The outside successor that is already CEO has achieved this 
position already.  To be attracted to the new position the experienced CEO may want to be 
compensated more.   
Firm performance and CEO turnover have been the focus of many corporate governance 
studies for years.  The importance of firm performance in CEO turnover has been examined 
extensively in studies such as Puffer and Weintrop (1991), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Murphy 
(1999), Engel, Hayes and Wang (2003), Farrell and Whidbee (2003), Kaplan and Minton (2006), 
and Jenter and Kanaan (2008).  However, Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia (2000) test the 
relation among firm size, performance and CEO pay, and find that firm size accounts for more than 
40% of the variance in CEO pay while firm performance accounts for less than 5%.  Apparently, 
firm size is also a big, if not bigger, factor in determining CEO compensation.  Then, how much are 
firm performance and firm size related to CEO compensation in the exCEO vs. non-exCEO 
comparison?  Cao and Wang (2008) show that in CEO contracting, total compensation is used to 
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induce retention while pay-at-risk is used to induce effort as a response to the risk involved in hiring 
a candidate.  Zhang and Rajagopalan (2003, 2006) state that hiring an outsider successor can impose 
higher risk to the hiring company.  Then, the hiring of an exCEO would lower some of the 
uncertainty associated with hiring an outsider. Combined with the greater bargaining position of the 
experienced CEO, the compensation (adjusted for firm size) would likely be greater for the 
experienced outside CEO successor than for the outside successor without CEO experience. This 
provides our next hypothesis: 
H4: Outside successors that have experience as CEO will receive greater total compensation 
than outside successors without CEO experience, and have a less percentage of pay-at-
risk compensation. 
 
2.4. Do Firms that Hire Experienced CEOs Achieve Better Performance? 
If firms hire outside CEOs with CEO experience in an attempt to improve poor prior 
performance, then an important question is whether this strategy is worth it.  Hiring an experienced 
CEO from the outside, one with a relatively short learning curve, may be able to find solutions to 
the problems that created the poor performance.  We, therefore, propose that hiring an outsider with 
CEO experience is more likely to bring improved financial performance than hiring an outsider 
without CEO experience.  So, our final hypothesis is: 
H5: Firms that hire exCEOs experience better performance and bigger performance gains 
post hiring than firms that hire Non-exCEOs. 
 
3.  DATA  
 We identify CEO succession announcements through ExecuComp and LexisNexis from 1993 
to 2008, and find 613 firms that have CEO turnovers; this number includes both inside and outside 
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successions.  We use the “SIC” column in the ExecuComp database which provides the last four-
digit Standard Industrial Classification code of the firms to eliminate regulated financial services 
firms (SIC is 6020-6799) and public utilities (SIC is 4911-4932). We exclude regulated firms 
because they likely have systematically different compensation schemes due to restrictions on their 
investment opportunity sets (DeFusco, Zorn & Johnson, 1991; Smith & Watts, 1992; Gaver & 
Gaver, 1993).  This filter deletes 61 firms from the sample (14 financial services firms and 47 public 
utilities). The sample decreases to 552 CEO turnovers.  We then match the sample with the CRSP 
database for data on stock market reaction, the ExecuComp database for compensation data and the 
COMPUSTAT database for data on firm performance.  After matching, we have 347 observations 
remaining in the sample with available data.  Since we are only examining outside successions we 
search for information about the successor’s origin and about the predecessor CEOs in the hiring 
firms from company proxy statements and from news announcements in the Wall Street Journal, the 
New York Times, and LexisNexis.  Fifty eight firms are deleted at this step due to lack of data.  Our 
final sample includes 289 outside succession announcements between the years of 1993 and 2008, 
of which 146 are exCEO successions and 143 are non-exCEO successions.  Of the 146 exCEOs, 
101 (69.2%) held the CEO position in one previous firm, 40 (27.4%) in two previous firms, 3 (2.1%) 
in three previous firms and 2 (1.4%) in four previous firms. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Market Reaction to Outside Succession 
We have hypothesized that the market will react more positively to outside CEO succession 
announcements when the outsider has prior CEO experience.  To address this hypothesis we 
conduct an event study with the succession announcement taking place on day 0.  We examine the 
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following event windows (0, 0), (−1, 0), (0, +1), and (−1, +1) for short-term effect and for long-term 
effect, the two windows of (−20,−1) and (0, +20).  The details of our event test procedure appear 
below.    
We first estimate a single index market model from day −300 to day −46 relative to day 0:  
  Rit = αi + βiRmt+eit, t = −300…−46.      (1) 
where:  
Rit  =  the return on security i at day t; 
Rmt =  the return on the equally-weighted market index at day t.   
We then obtain the abnormal return for security i on day t: 
  ARit  =  Rit  −  (αi  +  βiRmt), t = −1, 0, +1.     (2) 
We compute the cumulative abnormal returns from day t1 to day t2 for security i, CARi(t1,t2) 
as: 
                     ),( 21 ttCARi = ,
2
1
∑
=
t
tt
itAR  where t1 = -20, −1, 0, and t2 = −1, 0, +1, +20  (3) 
For a sample of N securities, we obtain the mean cumulative abnormal return, CAR(t1,t2), as: 
  CAR(t1,t2) = ∑
=
N
i
i ttCAR
1
21 ),( /N       (4) 
If there is no abnormal stock price movement, then CAR(t1, t2) would not be statistically different 
from zero. To test the statistical significance of CAR(t1, t2), we first use the parametric Patell Z-
statistic, and follow it with a non-parametric generalized sign Z statistic.  We further compare the 
abnormal returns of the exCEO successors to the non-exCEOs with a t-statistic. 
-----Insert Table 1 About Here----- 
Table 1 reports the CAR(t1, t2) estimations.  Prior to the announcement, both long-term and 
short-term windows show that firms that hire exCEOs underperform those that hire Non-exCEOs, 
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and the differences are significant with t-value at −3.206 for the window of (−1, 0) and −4.529 for 
the window of (−20, −1).   The results completely flipped at the announcement and post 
announcement, for both short term and long term.  On day 0, exCEO firms have a mean CAR of 
0.98% while the non-exCEO firms have a mean CAR of 0.60%, the difference is statistically 
significant with a t-value of 7.399.  Post announcement CARs extending to day 1 show the same 
pattern, with exCEO firms having a mean CAR(0, +1) of 1.69% versus 1.09% for non-exCEO firms, 
a significant difference with a t-value of 8.158.  Longer-term effect repeat the same results, when 
exCEO firms have a mean CAR of 2.86%, while non-exCEO firms’ mean CAR is 0.97%, with a 
significant t-value of 10.403 for the difference between the two groups.  The significant positive 
difference in reaction to the hiring of an exCEO, compared to the hiring of a non-exCEO is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1, implying that the stock market reacts more positively to outside 
succession announcements when the outside successor already has CEO experience, especially 
given that prior to the announcement, the results are completely the opposite.   
 
4.2 Pre-Succession Performance 
Our second hypothesis is that firms that hire an outsider who is an experienced CEO have 
worse financial performance than firms hiring non-experienced CEOs pre-succession.    We 
measure the financial strength of a firm by its debt ratio and Z score.  Debt ratio is calculated as total 
debt divided by book value of assets.  Z score measures the probability of bankruptcy and we adopt 
the classic Altman (1968)’s definition to calculate a firm’s Z score.   
-----Insert Table 2 About Here----- 
Table 2 first lists the firm’s prior performances for each of the 5 years before succession.   
We can see that consistent with Hypothesis 2, firms that hired exCEOs had significantly lower Z 
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scores (except for year −5), thus higher chance of bankruptcy than those that hired non-exCEOs.  T-
values range from 1.977 for year −4 to 3.055 for year −2.  Consistently, exCEO firms also had 
significantly higher debt ratio (except for year −4) than those that hired non-exCEOs, with t-values 
ranging from −1.759 to −2.196.  The findings of lower Z score and higher debt ratio echo with the 
larger, and more significant positive market reaction to the hiring of an experienced CEO in Table 1.  
The results suggest that the stock market welcomes the hiring of an exCEO to help turn around a 
poorly performing firm2.   
Table 2 also lists the successors’ previous firms’ prior performances for each of the five 
years before the succession.   For accounting measures such as the return on assets (ROA), we adjust 
for industry average as suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996).   A Chi-square test indicates that 
industry origination differs significantly between exCEO successors and non-exCEO successors , 
consistent with Hypothesis 3b, and a Fisher Exact test shows the same.  For the null hypothesis of 
the same industry origin between the two groups of successors, Pearson uncorrected, Yates 
corrected and Mantel-Haenszel Chi-square tests have p values of 0.02, 0.028 and 0.02 respectively, 
and the Fisher Exact test has a p value of 0.022, all of which reject the null at the 5% level.  
Therefore, consistent with previous research, there is significant industry effect and we have 
decided to use the industry-adjusted ROA measure.  To rule out any skewed effect from outliers, we 
delete any number that is outside of the +/− 300% thresholds.  We define ROA as net profits divided 
by the book value of assets and adjusted it for the industry median using four-digit SIC codes and 
three-digit SIC codes when there are less than three other firms in the same four-digit SIC code.  
We calculate IndAdjROA for the five years leading up to the succession.  Contradictory to 
Hypothesis 3a, IndAdjROA does not differ between the two types of origination firms with the 
                                                          
2
 Note that the Tobin’s Q values are also higher for firms that hire exCEOs, which may imply a tendency of some 
overvaluation of these firms.  We calculate Tobin’s Q using the method provided by Chung and Pruitt (1996). 
Page 13 of 32 Managerial Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
13 
 
highest t-value at 1.573 for year −4. However, consistent with Hypothesis 3a, the log of total assets, 
LogTA is significantly larger for the prior firms of non-exCEOs than it is for the prior firms of 
exCEOs, for all five previous years.  The t-values for the difference in size range from 2.320 for 
year −1 to 3.489 for year −5.   Perhaps if the hiring firm cannot hire an experienced CEO, they will 
hire someone who has worked in a larger firm.   
To further investigate if the hiring of an exCEO is related to prior-to-hiring performance of 
the current firm and the previous firm, we adopt a probit regression with an exCEO dummy (1 if 
hiring an exCEO; 0 otherwise) as the dependent variable and the current and previous firm’s prior-
to-hiring performance as independent variables.   
ExCEOi =α+ β1Qci,t+ β2Zci,t+ β3DEBTci,t+ β4 IndAdjRoAc I,t+ β5 LogTAc I,t 
      + γ
 1Qpi,t+ γ 2Zpi,t+ γ 3DEBTpi,t+ γ 4 IndAdjRoAp I,t+ γ 5 LogTAp I,t+ εi (5) 
The performance is measured in the same dimensions as in Table 2: Tobin’s Q, Z score, Debt 
ratio, IndAdjROA and LogTA.  The superscript ‘c’ denotes the performance of the current firm, 
while ‘p’ denotes the performance of the previous firm.  For the time frame t, we examine year −1, 
year −3 to −1 aggregate and year −5 to −1 aggregate performance, all relative to the succession year 
0, to capture all short-term and long-term effects. That is, we estimate the probit regression three 
times, once for each time frame.   
-----Insert Table 3 About Here---- 
The probit regression results appear in Table 3.  We find that successor’s previous firm’s 
size in year −1 significantly decreases the chance of the hiring of an exCEO, while the current 
firm’s size of the same year significant increases the chance.  Z score (which is inversely related to  
bankruptcy chance) of the current firm from year −3 to year −1 is significantly negatively related 
with the chance of hiring an exCEO, perhaps because the board feels more comfortable hiring an 
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exCEO if he/she has dealt with high chance of bankruptcy in his/her previous company.  Several 
other variables show marginal positive significance at the 10% level, such as the Tobin’s Q of the 
current firm at year −1 and year −5 to −1, and the firm’s industry adjusted ROA at year −1.   
 
4.3 CEO Compensation 
 In H4 we hypothesized that due to greater bargaining power, successor CEOs with prior 
CEO experience would receive greater total compensation than successors without CEO experience.  
Total compensation is generally structured to include a fixed salary component and a performance 
related pay-at-risk component.  We include bonus, restricted stocks and options in the pay-at-risk 
compensation.  We examine the various components of compensation surrounding the succession 
for both the predecessor at year −1 and the successor at year +1 relative to the hiring year, year 0. 
As a result, the compensation for the predecessor is measured in the fiscal year prior to the hiring 
year and the compensation for the successor is measured as of the fiscal year following the hiring 
year. We ignore the transition year (i.e. year 0, the year of hiring) since the transition year 
compensation data may include partial year compensation.  In addition, year 0 compensation may 
include extra compensation for the successor CEO for lost options at their previous firm and may 
contain departure compensation for the predecessor CEO. 
-----Insert Table 4 About Here----- 
Table 4 lists the univariate comparison in size (logTA) adjusted dollar amount compensation 
between the two types of successions.   In the first set of columns, we compare successor 
compensation in year +1 for exCEOs to that of non-exCEOs.  The results show that exCEO 
successors do not have significantly higher total compensation than non-exCEO successors 
($415.4466T vs. $346.0233T with a t-value of 1.321), though they have a marginally significantly 
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higher salary ($70.2273T vs. $64.0811T with a t-value of 1.708).  Other components of 
compensation all have insignificant t statistics between the two types of CEOs.  In the second set of 
columns, we compare the predecessor CEO compensation between those firms whose successor is 
an exCEO to those whose successor is a non-exCEO.  We do not find a significant difference in the 
predecessors’ compensation between the two groups.  In the third set of columns, we compare the 
prior compensation (in their former position).  That is, for exCEOs we compare their compensation 
as a CEO in their former firm to the prior compensation of the non-exCEO in their former position.  
ExCEOs, being CEOs in their previous jobs, have significantly higher total compensation, including 
salary and pay-at-risk than the non-exCEOs in their former position.  ExCEO successors made a 
yearly average of $355.6271T vs. non-exCEO successors’ $201.4268T with a t-value of 2.924, of 
which salary is 57.6641T vs. 45.2074T with a t-value of 2.771, and pay-at-risk is 205.3727T vs. 
106.0858T with a t-value of 2.214.   Among the three components of pay-at-risk, bonus and options 
both show significant difference, but there is no significance in the difference on restricted stocks. 
Table 5 examines compensation in more detail: instead of comparing the two successor 
groups, this time, the comparison is done over time for each group.   Panel A of Table 5 compares 
the successor pay amount in previous job with that of the new position, and Panel B of Table 5 
compares the pay amount of a predecessor’s with that of the successor’s.  Both show a statistically 
significant increase to the successor’s pay no matter if it is from the previous job, or as compared to 
the predecessor;  no matter it is the overall compensation amount or its component pay amount.  
Because compensation is heavily affected by firm size, the numbers reported here are all firm-size 
adjusted.   
-----Insert Table 5 About Here----- 
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4.4 Post Hiring Performance 
 In H5 we hypothesized that outside successors with prior experience as CEO would be more 
likely to have better post-succession performance than CEOs without this prior experience.  So we 
examine the post hiring performance of the firms that hired exCEOs and those that hired non-
exCEOs.  We first check firm performance post succession, and then connect the performance with 
CEO compensation in a regression framework to see if the compensation is in anyway justified by 
performance.   
-----Insert Table 6 About Here----- 
 Panel A of Table 6 shows that firms hiring exCEOs continue to experience higher Tobin’s Q, 
lower Z score (thus higher chance of bankruptcy) and higher debt ratio than non-exCEO successor 
firms, exactly the same relation as pre-hiring shown in Table 2.    The higher Tobin’s Q and lower Z 
score are statistically significant for the exCEOs than for non-exCEOs in more years than is the debt 
ratio.   Industry adjusted ROA and size only show marginal significant difference between the two 
types of firms in one of the five subsequent years.  Panel B of Table 6 compares the pre-to-post 
change of the two groups.  Non-exCEO firms actually see more significant increase in industry 
adjusted ROA and size than exCEO firms (Table 6 Panel B).   In this sense, the results from both 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 6 do not lend support for H5. 
-----Insert Table 7 About Here----- 
 To further examine the connection between compensation and performance, we estimate a 
regression model with successor’s compensation as the dependent variable and the ex-status of the 
successor and firm performance pre and post succession as the test variables.  We present the results 
in Table 7.  The ExCEO dummy is included to see if being an exCEO introduces any upward 
tendency in successor compensation.  The result shows that the estimated coefficient for the ExCEO 
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dummy is statistically insignificant.  Other independent variables in this regression include all the 
five performance measures used through the paper: Tobin’s Q, Z score, Debt ratio, IndAdjROA and 
LogTA.  The time frame for these performance measures are set for year +1 to +3, though other time 
frames (+1, and +1 to +5) generate similar results and are thus omitted from being reported here.  
To test if there is any marginal effect from being an exCEO, we also create interaction variables 
with the exCEO dummy variable and each performance measure.  We find that firm size post-
succession is significantly positive with a t-value of 5.729 in affecting successor compensation but 
the EXCEO dummy combined with firm size is insignificant with a t-value of 0.178.  Therefore, 
being an exCEO is not important in determining successor pay.  Other performance measures are 
not significant.  The importance of firm size and the less importance of firm performance are 
consistent with the finding of Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia (2000), whose result shows that 
size is about eight times more important than performance in explaining CEO pay variance.    
 
5. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 Performance measures such as Tobin’s Q may not be as direct a measure of managerial 
performance as stock returns, therefore, we replace Tobin’s Q with stock returns and our results 
persist.  Other factors such as whether the new ExCEOs are retired CEOs who perform this duty on 
an interim basis (which we have 23 such cases out of the 146 ExCEOs) also produce insignificant 
changes to our main findings.  There are 11 successors in our sample due to mergers or other value 
enhancing actions, but the results hold after we exclude them.  In addition, as reported in Section 4.2, 
our sample of ExCEOs depicts significant differences in industry origins, with 105 of them had 
prior experience in the same industry.  After re-running the tests with split samples of same-industry 
ExCEOs and different-industry ExCEOs, our results hold.   
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 Other characteristics of CEO successors such as age, education and career path all lead to 
insignificant changes to our results.  Specifically, we have 1 (0.4%) new CEO who is a co-founder 
or a founding family member. We have 34 (13.5%) new CEOs who have an output functional 
background, 159 (63.1%) new CEOs who have a throughput functional background and 58 (23%) 
new CEOs who have a peripheral functional background. We follow prior research by Chaganti and 
Sambharya (1987), Murray (1989), Michel and Hambrick (1992) and Westphal and Zajac (1995) in 
determining the new CEOs’ functional backgrounds by examining the prior job titles and 
employment history. Output functional backgrounds include positions in marketing and sales. 
Throughput functional backgrounds include positions in operations, R&D and engineering. 
Peripheral functional backgrounds include positions in law, finance and accounting. There is no 
significant difference between exCEOs and non-exCEOs when it comes to functional background.  
As to education backgrounds, we have 75 (31.1%) new CEOs who have an undergraduate degree, 
145 (60.2%) new CEOs who have a masters level degree and 21 (8.7%) new CEOs who have a 
Ph.D.  There is no significant difference between exCEOs and non-exCEOs when it comes to 
educational background.  Even Ivy League education does not make a significant difference 
between the 66 (27.4%) new CEOs who have an Ivy League degree and 175 (72.6%) new CEOs 
who have a non-Ivy League degree.  Finally, ExCEOs are slightly older with an average age of 
53.4110 years than non-ExCEOs, who average 52.4406 years of age, but the difference is 
statistically insignificant with a t value of 1.300.   
  
6.  CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we investigate an interesting yet mostly ignored distinction within external 
CEO successions: outside successors who have previous CEO experience and those who do not.  
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We find that firms hiring a CEO with experience have higher debt ratios and higher chance of 
bankruptcy pre-succession than those hiring a non-exCEO.  Consistently, the stock market reacts 
positively to succession announcements when the successor has prior CEO experience but not when 
the outside successor lacks this experience.  Non-exCEOs come from larger firms than exCEOs, but 
there is generally no significant difference between the performances of their prior firms.   
More surprisingly, there is no consistent results supporting a significant difference in 
compensation, both in amount and in structure, between an exCEO and a non-exCEO, though both 
increase significantly from that of the predecessor’s and their previous positions.  After hiring an 
exCEO, the successor firms still have worse financial performance than non-exCEO successor firms, 
and the pre-to-post change in performance indicates non-exCEO firms may even perform better 
between the two groups of successor firms.    
Future research could focus on the cost-benefit tradeoff of hiring an exCEO. It would be 
interesting to examine the role of the board of directors in assessing this cost-benefit tradeoff and 
determining the optimal choice for the firm.  An important aspect that has not been sufficiently 
examined in the literature is the CEO fit. Hiring an exCEO may not always be the right choice for 
the firm.  
Given the increasing frequencies of CEO turnover, especially outside CEO successions in 
recent years, CEO succession, performance, and compensation remains a heavily studied topic in 
finance and management academia.  It also remains as a heavily debated issue in popular media 
coverage, especially amid the current outrage over CEO compensation.  Our study connects the 
three important aspects surrounding CEO turnover together, and helps shed further light on to this 
interesting yet controversial issue.   
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Table 1: CARs around Hiring Announcements 
 
 
 
“ExCEO” represents the succession announcement day for the successor CEO who held CEO position in his/her 
previous firm. “Non-ExCEO” represents the succession announcement day for the successor CEO who did not hold the 
CEO position in his/her previous firm. “CAR” represents the cumulative abnormal stock price movement around the 
CEO succession announcement. “Patell Z-statistic” and “Rank Z-statistic” are used to test if the mean CARs are zero.  
Pair T-tests are used to test if the differences in mean CARs between ExCEO and Non-ExCEO announcements are zero.  
†/*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10/0.05/ 0.01/ 0.001 level. 
 
 
  
  ExCEO  
Non- 
ExCEO  
Paired 
T-test 
  
Mean 
CARs 
(N=122) 
Rank Test 
Z-statistic 
Patell Test 
Z-statistic 
Mean  
CARs 
(N=129) 
Rank Test 
Z-statistic 
Patell Test 
Z-statistic 
ExCEO- 
NonExCEO 
CAR (0,0) 0.98% 1.761* 2.495** 0.60% 1.410† 3.056*** 7.399*** 
CAR(−1, 0) 0.63% 0.770 1.216 0.82% 0.732 2.083* −3.206*** 
CAR(0,+1) 1.69% 3.318*** 3.834*** 1.09% 1.161 3.811*** 8.158*** 
CAR(−1,+1) 1.34% 2.321* 2.683** 1.31% 0.731 3.048*** 0.413 
CAR(−20,−1) 0.48% 1.976* 1.635† 1.26% 1.074 1.535$ −4.529*** 
CAR(0,+20) 2.86% 0.693 1.865* 0.97% 0.448 1.154 10.403*** 
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 Table 2: Current and Previous Firms’ Prior-to-Hiring Conditions 
(Non-ExCEO vs. ExCEO) 
      Year −5 Year −4 Year −3 Year −2 Year −1 
Current Firm             
 Z score Non-ExCEO 5.533 5.8237 6.2988 5.4992 4.5985 
  ExCEO 5.7387 4.5326 4.0831 3.563 3.4973 
    T test −0.207 1.977* 2.970** 3.055** 2.321* 
 Debt Ratio Non-ExCEO 22.588 23.2044 22.2059 23.1212 23.4534 
  ExCEO 26.7797 25.9933 27.1284 27.1466 27.8399 
    T test −1.759† −1.21 −2.196* −1.833† −1.904† 
 Tobin’s Q Non-ExCEO 0.15 0.1459 0.1495 0.1527 0.156 
  ExCEO 0.2497 0.227 0.2301 0.236 0.2632 
    T test −2.275* −1.974* −1.937† −2.120* −2.652** 
Previous  Firm        
 Ind.Adj.ROA Non-ExCEO 17.0571 21.7449 17.0189 20.8579 14.1307 
  ExCEO 16.0954 13.5137 21.7927 23.9597 15.4286 
    T test 0.179 1.573 −0.869 −0.553 −0.311 
 Log TA Non-ExCEO 8.8465 8.7931 8.8584 9.0134 9.1201 
  ExCEO 7.6869 7.9322 8.07 8.161 8.3978 
    T test 3.489*** 2.748** 2.577* 2.851** 2.320* 
 
“ExCEO” and “Non-ExCEO” represent the observations where the successor CEO did and did not hold the CEO 
position in his/her previous firm. Tobin’s Q is estimated using the method provided by Chung and Pruitt (1996). 
Debt ratio is total debt divided by book value of assets.  Z score is measured using the classic Altman (1968)’s definition.  
ROA is net profits divided by the book value of assets and adjusted for the industry median using four-digit SIC codes 
and three-digit SIC codes when there are less than three other firms in the same four-digit SIC code (Ind.Adj.ROA). 
Outliers of Ind.Adj.ROA outside of +/-300% are removed from the sample.  Firm size is measured by log of total assets 
(LogTA).  †/*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1/0.05/ 0.01/ 0.001 level. 
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Table 3: Probit Regression of ExCEO dummy on Prior to Hiring Performance 
(Current Firm and Previous Firm) 
 
Dependent variable= ExCEO  Year −1   Year −3 to −1 Year −5 to −1 
        coefficient p value coefficient p value coefficient p value 
      intercept 1.7509 0.0561 −0.2645 0.7458 −0.2467 0.7567 
Current Firm 
Performance Tobin'sQ 1.4564 0.0852 0.9651 0.1440 1.2425 0.0613 
Z score −0.0443 0.3763 −0.0967 0.0400 −0.0509 0.1158 
Debt ratio −0.0214 0.1069 −0.0140 0.2118 −0.0155 0.1739 
Ind.Adj.ROA 0.00748 0.0765 0.000295 0.9105 0.00331 0.1370 
      LogTA 0.2925 0.0012 0.1117 0.1112 0.1059 0.1280 
Previous Firm 
Performance Tobin'sQ 0.5287 0.5347 −1.0919 0.1228 −0.8174 0.2804 
Z score −0.0106 0.8738 0.0802 0.1214 0.0732 0.1232 
Debt ratio −0.0189 0.1553 0.0171 0.1147 0.00982 0.3899 
Ind.Adj.ROA −0.00080 0.8724 0.00560 0.1384 0.00400 0.3214 
      LogTA −0.3947 <0.0001 −0.0824 0.1753 −0.0904 0.1203 
Likelihood 
Ratio Test     42.2782 <0.0001 33.3376 0.0002 31.5128 0.0005 Chi square 
 
Dependent variable: 
“ExCEO” represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the successor CEO held the CEO position in his/her previous firm 
and 0 otherwise. 
Independent variables:  
Tobin’s Q is estimated using the method provided by Chung and Pruitt (1996).  Debt ratio is total debt divided by book 
value of assets.  Z score is measured using the classic Altman (1968)’s definition.  ROA is net profits divided by the 
book value of assets and adjusted for the industry median using four-digit SIC codes and three-digit SIC codes when 
there are less than three other firms in the same four-digit SIC code (Ind.Adj.ROA). Outliers of Ind.Adj.ROA outside of 
+/−300% are removed from the sample.  Firm size is measured by log of total assets (LogTA).  All the independent 
variables are either for year -1 or for year −3(−5) to −1 aggregate. 
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Table 4: Side-by-side Comparison of Outside Successor Pay Amount and Structure 
Non-ExCEOs vs. ExCEOs  
 
Dollar Amount (000s) 
  
Successor  
(t = +1) 
ExCEO 
Minus 
Non 
ExCEO 
Predecessor  
(t = −1) 
ExCEO 
Minus 
Non 
ExCEO  
Previous Job  
(t = −1) 
ExCEO 
Minus  
Non 
ExCEO  
  
Non- 
ExCEO ExCEO T-test 
Non-
ExCEO ExCEO T-test 
Non-
ExCEO ExCEO T-test 
Total 
Compensation 346.0233 415.4466 1.321 253.1249 302.8379 0.931 201.4268 355.6271 2.924** 
  
         Salary 64.0811 70.2273 1.708† 60.3475 60.7887 0.128 45.2074 57.6641 2.771** 
  
         Bonus 47.4662 60.7066 1.566 31.3606 32.4933 0.204 30.7529 49.0890 1.663† 
  
         Restricted 
Stock 50.7049 40.0393 −0.462 12.5427 19.8085 0.896 11.0784 22.3535 0.826 
  
         Options 164.7824 159.0106 −0.160 116.7989 142.2615 0.643 62.0449 127.0201 1.862† 
  
         Pay-at-Risk 268.9662 272.0453 0.060 162.7443 194.2879 0.737 106.0858 205.3727 2.214* 
  
                  
 
Total compensation and compensation components are shown in thousands of dollars.  “Successor (t=+1)” represents 
the successor CEO’s total compensation and compensation components in the year following the succession. 
“Predecessor (t= −1)” represents the predecessor CEO’s total compensation and compensation components in the year 
prior to the succession. “Previous Job (t =−1)” represents the successor CEO’s total compensation and compensation 
components in his/her previous job in the year prior to the succession. “Total Compensation” is the sum of salary, bonus, 
restricted stock, and options . “Pay-at-Risk” is the summation of bonus, restricted stock, and options. All compensation 
figures are adjusted by firm size, LogTA. T-tests are to compare the differences between the Non-ExCEO and ExCEO 
total compensation and compensation components. †/*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.1/0.05/ 0.01/ 
0.001 level.  
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Table 5: Pay Amount 
Panel A: Successor Current vs. Previous Job  
    Variables Median Mean N 
Previous 
minus  
Current 
T-test 
Non- 
ExCEO Previous(−1) 
Total 
Compensation 130.8112 201.4268 45 −2.572* 
 
Current(+1) 216.4438 346.0233 127 
 ExCEO Previous(−1) 217.1774 355.6271 54 −3.139** 
  Current(+1) 246.3901 415.4466 127 
Non- 
ExCEO Previous(−1) Salary 44.3073 45.2074 45 −4.987*** 
 
Current(+1) 67.2413 64.0811 129 
 ExCEO Previous(−1) 54.3807 57.6641 55 −3.422*** 
  Current(+1) 69.7348 70.2273 128 
Non- 
ExCEO Previous(−1) Bonus 26.6218 30.7529 45 −2.833** 
 
Current(+1) 33.1507 47.4662 136 
 ExCEO Previous(−1) 24.7820 49.0890 57 −1.815* 
  Current(+1) 42.6206 60.7066 138 
Non- 
ExCEO Previous(−1) 
Restricted 
Stocks 0.0000 11.0784 50 −1.539 
 
Current(+1) 0.0000 50.7049 119 
 ExCEO Previous(−1) 0.0000 22.3535 63 −0.895 
  Current(+1) 0.0000 40.0393 113 
Non- 
ExCEO Previous(−1) Options 26.4432 62.0449 44 −2.721** 
 
Current(+1) 53.9837 164.7824 114 
 ExCEO Previous(−1) 31.9097 127.0201 50 −1.155 
  Current(+1) 55.1236 159.0106 112 
 Non- 
ExCEO Previous(−1) Pay-at-Risk 77.9920 106.0858 44 −2.597* 
 
Current(+1) 125.9012 268.9662 114 
 ExCEO Previous(−1) 92.5392 205.3727 49 −2.238* 
  Current(+1) 139.5205 272.0453 111 
“ExCEO” and “Non-ExCEO” represent the observations where the successor CEO did and did not hold the CEO 
position in his/her previous firm. Total compensation and compensation components are shown in thousands of dollars.  
“Current (+1)” represents the successor CEO’s total compensation and compensation components in the year following 
the succession. “Previous (−1)” represents the successor CEO’s total compensation and compensation components in 
his/her previous job in the year prior to the succession. “Total Compensation” is the sum of salary, bonus, restricted 
stock, and options. “Pay-at-Risk” is the summation of bonus, restricted stock, and options. All compensation figures are 
adjusted by firm size, LogTA.  T-tests are to compare the differences between the Non-ExCEO and ExCEO total 
compensation and compensation components.  †/*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10/ 0.05/ 0.01/ 0.001 
level.  
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Table 5: Pay Amount 
Panel B:  Successor vs. Predecessor  
    Variables Median Mean N 
Predecessor 
minus  
Successor 
T-test 
Non- ExCEO Predecessor (−1) Total Compensation 150.0604 253.1249 130 −1.971† 
Successor (+1) 216.4438 346.0233 127  
ExCEO Predecessor (−1)   166.9145 302.8379 139 −2.254* 
  Successor (+1)   246.3901 415.4466 127  
Non- ExCEO Predecessor (−1) Salary 63.1418 60.3475 132 −1.468 
Successor (+1) 67.2413 64.0811 129 
 ExCEO Predecessor (−1)   62.9273 60.7887 141 −3.159** 
  Successor (+1)   69.7348 70.2273 128 
Non- ExCEO Predecessor (−1) Bonus 13.3126 31.3606 134 −2.690** 
Successor (+1) 33.1507 47.4662 136 
 ExCEO Predecessor (−1)   12.3480 32.4933 141 −4.009*** 
  Successor (+1)   42.6206 60.7066 138 
Non- ExCEO Predecessor (−1) Restricted Stocks  0.0000 12.5427 127 −2.133* 
Successor (+1) 0.0000 50.7049 119 
 ExCEO Predecessor (−1)   0.0000 19.8085 131 −1.860† 
  Successor (+1)   0.0000 40.0393 113 
Non- ExCEO Predecessor (−1) Options 40.4140 116.7989 125 −1.201 
Successor (+1) 53.9837 164.7824 114 
 ExCEO Predecessor (−1)   42.4642 142.2615 128 −0.193 
  Successor (+1)   55.1236 159.0106 112 
 Non- ExCEO Predecessor (−1) Pay-at-Risk 81.2310 162.7443 125 −2.470* 
Successor (+1) 125.9012 268.9662 114 
 ExCEO Predecessor (−1) 84.5906 194.2879 128 −1.711† 
  Successor (+1) 139.5205 272.0453 111 
 
“ExCEO” and “Non-ExCEO” represent the observations where the successor CEO did and did not hold the CEO 
position in his/her previous firm. Total compensation and compensation components are shown in thousands of dollars.  
“Successor” represents the successor CEO’s total compensation and compensation components in the year following the 
succession, year +1. “Predecessor” represents the predecessor CEO’s total compensation and compensation components 
in the year prior to the succession, year −1. “Total Compensation” is the sum of salary, bonus, restricted stock, and 
options. “Pay-at-Risk” is the summation of bonus, restricted stock, and options. All compensation figures are adjusted 
by firm size, LogTA.  T-tests are to compare the differences between the Non-ExCEO and ExCEO total compensation 
and compensation components.  †/*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10/ 0.05/ 0.01/ 0.001 level.  
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Table 6: ExCEO Firms vs. Non-ExCEO Firms  
Panel A: Post Hiring Condition  
 
 Variable   Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5 
Tobin's Q ExCEO 0.3208 0.3139 0.2848 0.2694 0.1860 
 Non-ExCEO 0.1636 0.1595 0.1583 0.1503 0.1187 
 T test 2.352* 2.921** 2.208* 1.884† 1.292 
Z score ExCEO 2.7984 2.9841 3.2114 3.2781 3.1175 
 Non-ExCEO 4.2206 4.4319 4.1063 4.2349 4.8342 
 T test −4.219*** −3.517*** −1.602 −1.156 −1.994* 
Debt ratio ExCEO 29.4539 31.0255 28.7536 26.1143 22.2537 
 Non-ExCEO 23.3010 23.1941 23.5665 23.0139 22.2585 
 T test 1.752† 2.353* 1.304 0.935 −0.002 
Ind.Adj.ROA ExCEO 18.7671 31.4238 21.1515 38.7078 40.4769 
Non-ExCEO 25.8419 26.2026 34.0341 48.0725 31.8087 
 T test −1.212 0.812 −1.875† −.929 0.811 
LogTA ExCEO 7.3891 7.3498 7.4000 7.2524 7.3509 
Non-ExCEO 6.9724 7.0134 6.9976 7.0551 7.0288 
  T test 1.824† 1.454 1.569 0.704 1.094 
 
“ExCEO” and “Non-ExCEO” represent the observations where the successor CEO did and did not hold the CEO 
position in his/her previous firm. Tobin’s Q is estimated using the method provided by Chung and Pruitt (1996). 
Debt ratio is total debt divided by book value of assets.  Z score is measured using the classic Altman (1968)’s definition.  
ROA is net profits divided by the book value of assets and adjusted for the industry median using four-digit SIC codes 
and three-digit SIC codes when there are less than three other firms in the same four-digit SIC code (Ind.Adj.ROA). 
Outliers of Ind.Adj.ROA outside of +/−300% are removed from the sample.  Firm size is measured by log of total assets 
(LogTA). †/*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10/ 0.05/ 0.01/ 0.001 level.  
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Table 6: ExCEO Firms vs. Non-ExCEO Firms 
Panel B: Pre-to-Post Change 
 
 Variable   
Year +1  
Vs.  
Year −1 
Year +1to+3  
Vs.  
Year −3 to −1 
Year +1to+5  
Vs.  
Year −5 to −1 
Tobin's Q ExCEO 0.04744 0.05825 0.04406 
 Non-ExCEO 0.00222 0.02271 0.03994 
 T test 1.025 2.747** 2.336* 
Z score ExCEO 
−0.58922 −0.57276 −0.90754 
 Non-ExCEO 
−0.41268 −1.36122 −1.79694 
 T test 
−2.536* −3.716*** −4.155*** 
Debt ratio ExCEO 0.50018 1.75607 0.33753 
 Non-ExCEO 
−0.51540 0.81468 2.00849 
 T test 
−0.006 1.263 0.927 
Ind.Adj.ROA ExCEO 
−2.29683 1.61298 16.95448 
Non-ExCEO 5.60915 9.94827 20.09300 
 T test 0.564 2.040* 4.626*** 
LogTA ExCEO −0.03780 0.06239 0.20671 
Non-ExCEO 0.04751 0.13468 0.21420 
  T test 0.194 3.318*** 5.066*** 
 
“ExCEO” and “Non-ExCEO” represent the observations where the successor CEO did and did not hold the CEO 
position in his/her previous firm. Tobin’s Q is estimated using the method provided by Chung and Pruitt (1996). 
Debt ratio is total debt divided by book value of assets.  Z score is measured using the classic Altman (1968)’s definition.  
ROA is net profits divided by the book value of assets and adjusted for the industry median using four-digit SIC codes 
and three-digit SIC codes when there are less than three other firms in the same four-digit SIC code (Ind.Adj.ROA). 
Outliers of Ind.Adj.ROA outside of +/−300% are removed from the sample.  Firm size is measured by log of total assets 
(LogTA).  †/*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10/ 0.05/ 0.01/ 0.001 level.  
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Table 7: Regressions of Successor Pay on Performance 
 
  Successor  
Total Compensation  
  Successor  
Total Compensation  
Post-hiring Performance 
Year+1 to +3 
  Prior-hiring Performance 
Year −3 to −1 
  
ExCEO  −2188.968 ExCEO  98.588 
 (−0.945)  (0.031) 
Tobin Q  −2333.258 Tobin Q  −567.938 
 (−1.215)  (−0.177) 
Z Score  −33.297 Z Score  162.024 
 (−0.262)  (0.653) 
Debt Ratio  25.521 Debt Ratio  5.867 
 (0.863)  (0.115) 
Ind.Adj.ROA −0.260 Ind.Adj.ROA  3.213 
 (−0.804)  (0.221) 
Log TA  1269.509 Log TA  365.915 
 (5.729)***  (1.416) 
ExCEO * Tobin Q  3186.233 ExCEO * Tobin Q  −1574.655 
 (1.431)  (−0.385) 
ExCEO * Z Score  390.910 ExCEO * Z Score  −236.417 
 (2.079)*  (−0.878) 
ExCEO * Debt Ratio  −9.024 ExCEO * Debt Ratio  14.663 
 (−0.261)  (0.238) 
ExCEO * Ind.Adj.ROA 1.289 ExCEO * Ind.Adj.ROA  18.086 
 (1.028)  (1.035) 
ExCEO * Log TA  48.210 ExCEO * Log TA  125.570 
  (0.178)   (0.372) 
Adjusted R2 0.362 Adjusted R2 0.068 
      (F) (6.244)***       (F) (1.241) 
 
“Successor Total Compensation (Post-hiring Performance)” is the dependent variable for the first regression and 
represents the successor CEO’s total compensation for the year following the succession. “Successor Total 
Compensation (Prior-hiring performance)” is the dependent variable for the second regression and represents the 
successor CEO’s total compensation in his/her previous job in the year prior to the succession. Independent variables are 
listed as following: “ExCEO” represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the successor CEO held the CEO position in 
his/her previous firm and 0 otherwise.  Tobin’s Q is estimated using the method provided by Chung and Pruitt (1996).  
Debt ratio is total debt divided by book value of assets.  Z score is measured using the classic Altman (1968)’s definition.  
ROA is net profits divided by the book value of assets and adjusted for the industry median using four-digit SIC codes 
and three-digit SIC codes when there are less than three other firms in the same four-digit SIC code (Ind.Adj.ROA). Firm 
size is measured by log of total assets (LogTA).  All the independent variables in the first regression are for year +1 to 
+3 aggregate and for the second regression for year −3 to −1 aggregate. †/*/**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 
0.1/0.05/ 0.01/ 0.001 level.  Year dummies from 1993 to 2008 are also included in the regressions, though their 
coefficient estimates are not reported to save space. 
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